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The transferable utility hypothesis underlies important theoretical results in
household economics. We provide a revealed preference framework for bringing
this (theoretically appealing) hypothesis to observational data. We establish re-
vealed preference conditions that must be satisfied for observed household con-
sumption behavior to be consistent with transferable utility. We also show that
these conditions are testable by means of integer programming methods.
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1. Introduction
Household consumption analysis takes a prominent position in the microeconomics lit-
erature. In settings with multiple household members, theoretical consumption models
often assume transferable utility. As we will explain below, this assumption considerably
simplifies the analysis. This paper provides a framework for bringing the (theoretically
appealing) transferable utility hypothesis to empirical data. Specifically, we define the
testable implications of transferable utility in revealed preference terms.
The transferable utility hypothesis is popular in household economics. It under-
lies important theoretical results in the modeling of household behavior. Probably the
best known example here is Becker’s (1974) rotten kid theorem; see Bergstrom (1989) for
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an insightful discussion. Bergstrom (1997) provides an extensive review of (other) ap-
plications of the transferable utility hypothesis in theoretical household models. Essen-
tially, transferable utility means that it is possible to transfer utility from one household
member to another member in a lossless manner, i.e., without affecting the aggregate
household utility. Under transferable utility, the frontier of the Pareto set is always a
straight line of slope −1. This makes the intrahousehold distribution of resources in-
dependent of the aggregate household decisions: individual household members will
always behave so as to maximize the size of the Pareto set.
The transferable utility assumption is popular because it has several highly desirable
implications. First of all, it guarantees that household demand behavior displays at-
tractive aggregation properties. In particular, any household then satisfies the so-called
unitary model of household consumption, which means that aggregate household de-
mand behaves as if it were generated by a single individual. However, as we will also
discuss further on, consistency with the unitary model does not necessarily imply con-
sistency with transferable utility, i.e., unitary household behavior is necessary but not
sufficient for transferable utility. Next, the transferable utility hypothesis considerably
facilitates welfare analysis. As the distribution of resources over the different house-
hold members does not influence the household decisions, welfare analysis can focus
exclusively on the aggregate utility/welfare. Generally, utilizing the transferable utility
hypothesis makes the life of household economists a lot easier. Nevertheless, despite
its wide prevalence in theoretical work, the empirical implications of transferable utility
have hardly been studied (for more details, see Section 2).
This paper fills this gap: we develop tools for investigating the empirical realism of
the transferable utility hypothesis. More specifically, we establish revealed preference
conditions for observed consumption behavior to be consistent with the transferable
utility assumption under Pareto efficient household behavior. These conditions are eas-
ily testable as they only require observations on consumed quantities at the household
level and corresponding prices; testing the conditions can use standard integer pro-
gramming methods. In addition, the test is entirely nonparametric, i.e., its empirical
implementation does not require a prior (typically nonverifiable) functional structure
for the utility functions of the individuals in the household.1
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly recapture
some important building blocks for our following analysis and we articulate our own
contributions to the existing literature. Here, we will also indicate that the so-called gen-
eralized quasilinear (GQL) utility specification provides a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a Pareto optimal household allocation rule to be consistent with transferable
utility. In Section 3, we then formally define this GQL specification. Section 4 subse-
quently presents the corresponding revealed preference characterization and discusses
how to bring our results to the data. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
1In the working paper version of this paper (Cherchye et al. 2011b), we provide a first empirical test of
the transferable utility hypothesis. Specifically, we apply our revealed preference conditions to data drawn
from the Encuesta Continua de Presupestos Familiares (ECPF), a Spanish consumer expenditure survey.
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2. Testable implications of transferable utility
2.1 Generalized quasilinearity
To define the testable implications of transferable utility at the household level, we need
to characterize the underlying utility functions of the individuals within the household.
The best known specification leading to the property of transferable utility is the quasi-
linear (QL) utility specification. This specification requires the utility functions of the
individuals to be linear in at least one good, usually called the numeraire. Unfortunately,
QL utility has strong and unrealistic implications (e.g., absence of income effects for all
but a single good, risk neutrality, etc.).
In the presence of public goods, Bergstrom and Cornes (1981, 1983) and Bergstrom
(1989) showed that a weaker form than QL utility equally implies transferable utility, i.e.,
generalized quasilinear utility (a term coined by Chiappori 2010).2 Interestingly, these
authors also showed that this GQL specification provides a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for transferable utility under Pareto efficient household behavior. The GQL form
can be obtained from the QL specification through multiplication of the numeraire by
a function defined in terms of the bundle of (intrahousehold) public goods. The addi-
tional requirement that this function is common to all individuals within the household
provides the property of transferable utility. As households typically consume a large
amount of public goods, this characterization of transferable utility is particularly con-
venient in household settings.
Recently, Chiappori (2010) derived a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on
the (aggregate) household demand function such that it is compatible with a Pareto ef-
ficient allocation where household members are endowed with GQL utility functions.
As far as we know, this is the first (and—until now—sole) study that makes the testable
implications of transferable utility explicit. In view of our following exposition, we note
that Chiappori adopted a so-called differential approach to characterizing GQL utility:
he focused on testable (differential) properties of the household demand function to be
consistent with transferable utility. Practical applications of this differential approach
then typically require a prior parametric specification of this demand function, which
is to be estimated from the data. As we will indicate below, this implies a most notable
difference with the approach that we follow here.
2.2 Revealed preference implications
We complement Chiappori’s findings by establishing testable conditions of transfer-
able utility (or GQL utility) in the revealed preference tradition of Samuelson (1938),
2As a bibliographic note, we indicate that the origins of these authors’ work date back to Gorman’s (1961)
seminal contribution on the aggregation of indirect utility functions defined over private goods, hereby in-
troducing the notion of what is currently known as Gorman polar form preferences. Bergstrom and Varian
(1985) applied Gorman’s analysis to the case of transferable utility in markets with private goods. Bergstrom
and Cornes (1981, 1983) and Bergstrom (1989) used duality theory to extend Gorman’s aggregation theorem
to the case of transferable utility with public goods. Recently, Cherchye et al. (2012) established a revealed
preference characterization of Gorman’s original aggregation conditions for private goods (including Gor-
man polar form preferences). Given the above, this last characterization can thus be seen as complemen-
tary (“dual”) to the revealed preference characterization of transferable utility that we develop here.
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Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982). In contrast to the
differential approach, this revealed preference approach obtains conditions that can be
verified by (only) using a finite set of household consumption observations (i.e., prices
and quantities) and, thus, it does not require the estimation of a household demand
function. As such, a main advantage of these revealed preference conditions is that they
allow a nonparametric analysis of the data: they do not impose any functional form
on the utility function (generating a particular household demand function) except for
usual regularity conditions.
More specifically, we get necessary and sufficient conditions that enable checking
consistency of a given data set with transferable utility. In the spirit of Varian (1982),
we refer to this as “testing” data consistency with transferable utility. As for the practi-
cal application of this test, we also show that our revealed preference conditions can be
equivalently reformulated as integer programming constraints. This integer program-
ming formulation allows us to test data consistency with transferable utility by applying
standard integer programming solution techniques.
2.3 Remarks
At this point, it is worth indicating one further important difference between our study
and the original study of Chiappori (2010). To establish his characterization, Chiap-
pori assumed observability of the numeraire good. However, in practice this numeraire
good is typically an “outside” good, i.e., the amount of money not spent on observed
consumption, which is usually not recorded in real-life applications. Given this, our
following revealed preference analysis will principally focus on characterizing transfer-
able utility for the case with an unobserved numeraire (or outside good). To obtain this
characterization, we will first have to establish the characterization that applies to an
observed numeraire.
As a final remark, we indicate that Brown and Calsamiglia (2007) developed a re-
vealed preference characterization of the QL utility specification. By focusing on the
GQL utility form, we provide revealed preference conditions for a model that contains
this QL specification as a special case.
3. Generalized quasilinear utility
Consider a household with M (≥ 2) members. Each member m (≤M) consumes a bun-
dle of N + 1 private goods (qmxm) ∈RN+1+ and a bundle of K public goods Q ∈RK+ . The
private good xm denotes member m’s amount of the numeraire. For each m, we assume
xm > 0 in what follows.3 In addition, we normalize by setting the price of the numeraire
equal to 1. Next, the vector p ∈RN++ represents the normalized price vector for the bun-
dle of private goods qm, while the vector P ∈ RK++ is the normalized price vector for the
bundle of public goods Q.
3Admittedly, this assumption may seem strong from an empirical point of view. However, similar to
quasilinearity, it is a necessary condition to obtain transferable utility. Specifically, if xm = 0 in (1), then
um(qm0Q) = bm(Qqm), which gives a nontransferable utility function. In this respect, it is also worth
emphasizing that we do not impose any strict positivity restriction on goods different from the numeraire.
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The utility of member m is represented by the strictly increasing and quasiconcave
utility function um(qmxmQ). The utility functions um are said to be of the GQL form
if there exist a (member-specific) function bm :RK+N+ → R and a (common) function
a :RK+ →R++ such that
um(qmxmQ)= a(Q)xm + bm(Qqm) (1)
Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) have shown that member-specific GQL utilities are neces-
sary and sufficient for transferable utility under Pareto efficient household behavior.4
The GQL specification encompasses the QL specification as a special case. Specifi-
cally, if a(Q)= a for all Q (i.e., the function value a(Q) is everywhere the same), then the
specification in (1) coincides with the QL specification:
um(qmxmQ)= axm + bm(Qqm)
However, if a(Q) varies with the level of public goods, then the GQL specification vastly
expands the range of utility functions compatible with transferable utility.
We assume that household decisions are made according to the Pareto criterion:
allocations are chosen such that no member can be made better off without reducing
the utility of some other household member.5 In this case, any equilibrium allocation
(q1    qMx1     xMQ) minimizes total household expenditures subject to the con-
straint that every member of the household receives at least some predefined level of
utility u¯m. In other words, given a fixed vector of utility levels (u¯1     u¯M) ∈ RM+ , Pareto
efficiency imposes that the household decision making process solves the optimization
problem
min
(q1qMx1xMQ)∈RM(N+1)+K+
M∑
m=1
xm +
M∑
m=1
pqm +PQ
s.t. a(Q)xm + bm(Qqm)≥ u¯m (∀m≤M)
(OP.1)
In view of our following analysis, we develop an equivalent formulation of (OP.1).6
To obtain the formulation, we first observe that each constraint will be binding in the
solution of (OP.1) because the utility functions um are strictly increasing. Using this, and
because xm > 0 for all m, we can substitute the restrictions in the objective function. As a
4See also Browning et al. (2014, p. 276) for a detailed discussion of this functional specification.
5See Chiappori (1988) and Cherchye et al. (2007, 2009, 2011a) for revealed preference tests of the as-
sumption of Pareto optimality without the additional assumption of transferable utility. As is clear from the
restrictions in optimization problem (OP.1), transferable utility imposes a specific structure on individual
utilities on top of Pareto efficiency. This extra structure plays a crucial role for our subsequent revealed pref-
erence characterization, which is substantially different (i.e., more restrictive) from the characterization of
Pareto efficiency in the above-mentioned references.
6It can be shown that the functions a and bm in (OP.1) are in general not concave. This makes it difficult to
derive a revealed preference characterization of transferable utility directly from (OP.1). By contrast, as we
explain below, the functions α and βm in (OP.2) are convex and concave, respectively, and these properties
will be crucial to obtain our revealed preference characterizations in Propositions 1 and 2.
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result, we can equivalently reformulate the original optimization problem as
min
(q1qMQ)∈RMN+K+
α(Q)
M∑
m=1
u¯m −
M∑
m=1
βm(qmQ)+
M∑
m=1
pqm +PQ
with α(Q)= 1
a(Q)
and βm(qmQ)= b
m(qmQ)
a(Q)
(∀m≤M)
(OP.2)
From this equivalent formulation, it is directly clear that the optimal solution of
problem (OP.1) only depends on the total amount of utility
∑M
m u¯
m, but not on the spe-
cific distribution of this amount over the different household members. This demon-
strates the property of transferable utility under GQL.
Standard first order conditions characterize the (interior) solutions of problem
(OP.2) if the function α is convex and the functions βm are concave. Bergstrom and
Cornes (1983) showed that these requirements are equivalent to the condition that the
utility functions um are quasiconcave (which we assumed before). Next, it is easy to ver-
ify that α is decreasing in Q while the βm are increasing in q. If we further assume that bm
and a are bounded from below and a is strictly positive, then βm is also increasing in Q.7
For an optimal solution (q1∗    qM∗x1∗     xM∗Q∗) of problem (OP.2), the first order
conditions are8
−∂α(Q
∗)
∂Q
M∑
m=1
u¯m +
M∑
m=1
∂βm(qm∗Q∗)
∂Q
= P (foc.1)
∂βm(qm∗Q∗)
∂qm
= p (foc.2)
xm∗
α(Q∗)
+ β(q
m∗Q∗)
α(Q∗)
= u¯m (foc.3)
Conditions (foc.1) and (foc.2) provide a formal expression of the household’s marginal
decision rules for the public and private goods, respectively. Next, condition (foc.3)
complies with the GQL utility specification in (1). The first order conditions (foc.1)–
(foc.3) provide a useful starting point for developing our revealed preference character-
ization in the next section.
4. Revealed preference characterization
We analyze the (aggregate) consumption behavior of a household with M individuals, by
starting from a finite set T of observed household choices. For each observation t ∈ T ,
we know the privately and publicly consumed quantities qt and Qt , as well as the cor-
responding prices pt and Pt . Note that we only observe the aggregate private quantities
qt and not the member-specific quantities qmt . In a first instance, we assume that the
7We can show this by contradiction. Assume that βm is nonincreasing in Q at some bundle. Then, con-
cavity of βm implies that βm is unbounded from below. However, as a is strictly positive for all Q, this
means that bm must be unbounded from below, which gives the wanted contradiction. We thank Phil Reny
for pointing this out to us.
8If α or β is not differentiable, we may take the sub- and superdifferentials that satisfy the corresponding
first order conditions. The same applies to the proof of Proposition 1.
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aggregate amount of the numeraire (outside) good at every t (i.e., xt ) is also observed
(again we assume that the member-specific quantities xmt are not observed). We will re-
lax this assumption later on. As discussed before, we believe an unobserved numeraire
is a more realistic assumption for real-life applications.
4.1 Numeraire observed
If the consumption of the numeraire is observed, then the relevant data set is S =
{pt Pt;xtqt Qt}t∈T . In what follows, we present necessary and sufficient conditions
for the set S to be rationalizable in terms of GQL utility functions, i.e., there exist func-
tions α and βm so that each bundle (xtqt Qt ) (t ∈ T ) leads to a solution for (OP.2). This
provides a characterization of transferable utility in the revealed preference tradition.
Our starting definition is the following.
Definition 1 (TU-rationalizability). The data set S = {pt Pt;xtqt Qt}t∈T is transfer-
able utility rationalizable (TU-rationalizable) if (i) there exist a convex and decreas-
ing function α :RK+ → R, and M concave and increasing functions βm :RN+K+ → RN ,
and (ii) for each t, there exist private consumption bundles q1t     q
M
t that sum to qt
and strictly positive numbers x1t      x
M
t that sum to xt such that {q1t     qMt Qt} solves
(OP.2) given the prices pt and Pt , and utility levels u¯mt = x
m
t
α(Qt )
+ βm(qmt Qt )α(Qt ) .
Of course, the above definition could equally well have been stated by using the
functions a and bm, and by referring to program (OP.1). We opt for the current statement
to enhance the interpretation of the revealed preference characterization below.
It follows from Definition 1 that the concept of TU-rationalizability implicitly de-
pends on the number of individuals within the household. However, as the following
result shows, this qualification is actually irrelevant in view of practical applications: it
is empirically impossible to distinguish between different household sizes; there exists a
rationalization of the set S in terms of a single individual (i.e., M = 1) if and only if there
exists one in terms of any number of individuals. More specifically, we can prove the
following result.9
Proposition 1. Consider a data set S = {pt Pt;xtqt Qt}t∈T . The following statements
are equivalent:
(i) The data set S is TU-rationalizable for a household ofM individuals.
(ii) The data set S is TU-rationalizable for a household of a single individual.
(iii) For all t ∈ T , there exist αt ∈ R++, βt u¯t ∈ R+, λαt ∈ RK− , and λβt ∈ RK++ such that,
for all t v ∈ T ,
αt − αv ≥ λαv (Qt −Qv) (RP.1)
βt −βv ≤ pv(qt − qv)+λβv (Qt −Qv) (RP.2)
9Appendix A contains the proofs of our main results.
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λ
β
t −λαt u¯t = Pt (RP.3)
u¯t = xt
αt
+ βt
αt
 (RP.4)
The equivalence between statements (i) and (ii) demonstrates the aggregation prop-
erty of the transferable utility assumption that we mentioned above: if a data set is TU-
rationalizable for a household of M individuals, then it is rationalizable for a single in-
dividual (endowed with a GQL utility function) and vice versa.10 Statement (iii) then
provides the combinatorial conditions that characterize the collection of data sets that
are TU-rationalizable. The first two conditions ((RP.1) and (RP.2)) define so-called Afriat
inequalities that apply to our specific setting. In terms of Definition 1, these inequal-
ities correspond to, respectively, the (convex) function α and the (concave) function β
(where we drop the index m because of the equivalence between statements (i) and (ii)).
The vectors λαt and λ
β
t then represent the gradient vectors of these functions in terms of
the public goods bundle. Finally, the conditions (RP.3) and (RP.4) give the revealed pref-
erence counterparts of the first order conditions (foc.1) and (foc.3) that we discussed in
the previous section.
4.2 Numeraire unobserved
In real-life applications the amount of the numeraire good is usually not observed. For
example, this will also be the case in our own application. The relevant data set is then
given as S = {pt Pt;qt Qt}t∈T .
Interestingly, the result in Proposition 1 enables us to establish a characterization of
transferable utility for such a data set S. Specifically, we can derive the following result.
Proposition 2. Consider a data set S = {pt Pt;qt Qt}t∈T . The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) For all t ∈ T , there exist xt ∈ R++ such that {pt Pt;xtqt Qt}t∈T is TU-
rationalizable for a household of M individuals (or, equivalently, a single
individual).
(ii) For all t ∈ T , there existUAt UBt ∈R+, λAt ∈R++, PAt ∈RK+ , and PBt ∈RK++ such that,
for all t v ∈ T ,
UAt −UAv ≤ λAt [PAv (Qt −Qv)] (RP.5)
UBt −UBv ≤ pv(qt − qv)+PBv (Qt −Qv) (RP.6)
PAt +PBt = Pt  (RP.7)
When compared to the characterization in Proposition 1, the conditions (RP.5),
(RP.6), and (RP.7) in Proposition 2 correspond to (RP.1), (RP.2), and (RP.3), respectively.
We refer to the proof of the result for an explicit construction. This proof also shows
that for each observation t, we can always construct a numeraire quantity xt that meets
condition (RP.4) if the data satisfy (RP.5)–(RP.7).
10Chiappori (2010) obtained a similar result in his differential setting.
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As we motivated before, we believe that the empirically interesting setting is the one
where the quantity of the numeraire good is not observed. The conditions (RP.6) and
(RP.7) in Proposition 2 are linear and therefore easily verifiable, while the Afriat inequal-
ities in condition (RP.5) are quadratic (i.e., nonlinear in the unknown λt ’s and PAt ’s).
From a practical point of view, this nonlinearity makes it difficult to empirically ver-
ify the characterization in Proposition 2. However, in Appendix B, we show that these
Afriat inequalities can be equivalently restated in terms of linear (mixed) binary integer
programming constraints.
4.3 Nested models
To conclude this section, we discuss the relationship between the transferable utility
conditions developed above and closely related rationalizability conditions that have
been considered in the revealed preference literature. Specifically, we make explicit how
the transferable utility model is situated “between” the QL utility model and the unitary
model. This further clarifies the interpretation of our revealed preference characteriza-
tion of transferable utility.
As a first exercise, we recall from the previous section that QL utility imposes that
the function value α(Q) is constant for all Q. In terms of the characterization in Propo-
sition 1, this means that the gradient vector λαt equals 0. One can then easily verify that
the conditions (RP.1)–(RP.4) reduce to
βt −βv ≤ pt (qt − qv)+Pt (Qt −Qv) (RP.8)
This condition is necessary and sufficient for data consistency with the QL utility spec-
ification.11 We observe that the QL condition (RP.8) is independent of the level of the
numeraire (xt ), which implies a notable difference with our above characterization of
GQL utility. In fact, this independence is also revealed by the fact that the conditions
(RP.5)–(RP.7) in Proposition 2 equally coincide with (RP.8) if we set PAt equal to zero for
all t ∈ T (which has a similar meaning as λαt = 0 in Proposition 1).
Next, it directly follows from statement (ii) in Proposition 1 that the transferable util-
ity model is nested in the unitary model. In fact, in Appendix C we show that conditions
(RP.1)–(RP.4) automatically require that the data satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed
preference (GARP), which is necessary and sufficient for data consistency with the uni-
tary model (Varian 1982). In other words, if a household data set is TU-rationalizable,
then the household acts as a single individual. However, a household may well behave
as if it were a single decision maker without satisfying transferable utility. In this sense,
our revealed preference conditions in Propositions 1 and 2 capture the additional re-
strictions that observed consumption behavior must satisfy for the transferable utility
assumption to hold. Our conditions effectively allow for bringing these specific restric-
tions of TU-rationalizability to empirical data.
In this respect, one further point relates to Proposition 2. This result makes clear that
transferable utility has testable implications even if the numeraire good is not observed.
11In fact, condition (RP.8) is equivalent to the revealed preference condition that Brown and Calsamiglia
(2007) originally derived for data consistency with the QL specification.
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By contrast, following a revealed preference approach similar to ours, Varian (1988) has
shown that the unitary model does not have any testable implications as soon as we do
not observe the consumption quantity of some good (in this case the numeraire quan-
tity xt ). We believe this is an interesting observation, as it suggests that considering the
transferable utility model may be empirically meaningful even if the unitary model is
nontestable.
5. Conclusion
We have presented revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied by observed
behavior to be consistent with transferable utility (or GQL utility) under Pareto effi-
ciency. These conditions are easily verified by using integer programming techniques,
which is attractive from a practical point of view. This provides an easy-to-apply frame-
work for evaluating the empirical realism of the transferable utility hypothesis in ob-
servational settings. As a side result, our theoretical discussion also made clear how
the transferable utility model is situated between the quasilinear and unitary models:
its (revealed preference) testable implications are weaker than the QL implications but
stronger than the unitary implications.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
(ii) → (iii). By convexity of the function α(Q) and concavity of the function β(qQ), we
must have that for all observations t v ∈ T ,
α(Qt )− α(Qv) ≥ ∂α(Qv)
∂Q
(Qt −Qv)
βm(qt Qt )−βm(qvQv) ≤ ∂β(qvQv)
∂q
(qt − qv)+ ∂β(qvQv)
∂Q
(Qt −Qv)
For all t ∈ T , define αt = α(Qt ), βt = β(qt Qt ), u¯t = u(xtqt Qt ), λαt = ∂α(Qt )∂Q , and
λ
β
t = ∂β(qt Qt )∂Q . Then substituting and using the first order conditions (foc.1)–(foc.3), we
obtain conditions (RP.1)–(RP.4).
(i) → (iii). The proof is similar to the case (ii) → (iii) except now we define βt =∑
mβ
m(qmt Qt ) and λ
β
t =
∑ ∂β(qmt Qt )
∂Q .
(iii) → (ii). Define the functions α(Q) and β(qQ) in the manner
α(Q) = max
t∈T
{αt +λαt (Q−Qt )} (A.1)
β(qQ) = min
t∈T
{βt + pt (q− qt )+λβt (Q−Qt )} (A.2)
Define u(xqQ)= xα(Q) + β(qQ)α(Q) .
The function α is convex and β is concave, hence u is quasiconcave. Furthermore, it
is increasing in both q and Q. Finally, using a similar argument as Varian (1982, p. 970),
we can derive that α(Qt )= αt and β(qt Qt )= βt for all t ∈ T .
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Given all this, we can prove the result ad absurdum. Suppose that S is not TU-
rationalizable. Then there must exist an allocation {xqQ} such that x + ptq + PtQ <
xt + ptqt +PtQt and u(xqQ)≥ u(xtqt Qt )= u¯t . We thus get
x+ ptq+PtQ ≥ u¯tα(Q)−β(qQ)+ ptq+PtQ
≥ u¯tαt −βt + (λαt u¯t −λβt )(Q−Qt )− pt (q− qt )+ ptq+PtQ
= xt + ptqt +PtQt 
which gives the wanted contradiction. (The first inequality combines u(xqQ) =
(x/α(Q)) + (β(qQ)/α(Q)) with u(xqQ) ≥ u¯t , the second inequality uses (A.1) and
(A.2), and the final equality uses (RP.3) and (RP.4).)
(iii) → (i). The argument is similar to the one for (iii) → (ii) when using the additional
definition βm(qmQ) = (1/M)β(MqmQ). Then, for all t ∈ T and m ≤ M , we set qmt =
qt/M and xmt = xt/M .
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) → (ii). Assume that there exist numbers xt such that {pt Pt;xtqt Qt}t∈T is TU-
rationalizable. Then it follows from Proposition 1 that there exist positive numbers αt ,
βt , and u¯t , and vectors λαt ∈RK− and λβt ∈RK++ such that
αt − αv ≥ λαv (Qt −Qv) (RP.1)
βt −βv ≤ pv(qt − qv)+λβv (Qt −Qv) (RP.2)
λ
β
t −λαt u¯t = Pt (RP.3)
u¯t = xt
αt
+ βt
αt
 (RP.4)
For all t ∈ T , setting βt = UBt , λβt = PBt , and PAt = −λαt u¯t translates conditions (RP.2)
and (RP.3) into conditions (RP.6) and (RP.7). So we only need to demonstrate condi-
tion (RP.5).
Multiplying (RP.1) by −1 gives
−αt − (−αv)≤ 1
u¯t
PAv (Qt −Qv)
Given this, setting λAt = 1/u¯t > 0 and UAt = −αt − minv{−αv} ≥ 0 establishes condi-
tion (RP.5).
(ii) → (i). Assume that there exist numbers UAt , UBt , and λAt , and vectors PAv and PBv
such that
UAt −UAv ≤ λAt [PAv (Qt −Qv)] (RP.5)
UBt −UBv ≤ pv(qt − qv)+PBv (Qt −Qv) (RP.6)
PAt +PBt = Pt  (RP.7)
First, by setting, for all t ∈ T , βt =UBt and λβt = PBt , we derive (RP.2).
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Next, we define u¯t = 1/λAt and PAt /u¯t = −λαt . Substitution in condition (RP.7) gives
condition (RP.3).
Further, multiplying (RP.5) by −1 gives
−UAt − (−UAv )≥ λαt (Qt −Qv) (A.3)
As u¯t > 0, there exists a number δ > 0 such that u¯t > δ for all t ∈ T . Now consider a num-
ber z ∈ R++ and define αt such that (i) αt ≡ −UAt + z > 0 (∀t ∈ T ) and (ii) 0<βt/αt ≤ δ.
These conditions can be guaranteed by taking z large enough. Using this definition of
αt in condition (A.3) above gives condition (RP.1).
Finally, we define xt such that
xt ≡ αtu¯t −βt > 0
which obtains condition (RP.4).
Appendix B: Integer programming formulation
To obtain an integer programming formulation of our characterization in Proposition 2
we make use of Afriat’s theorem (see Varian 1982, based on Afriat 1967). Specifically, it
follows from this theorem that the set Z = {PAt ;Qt}t∈T satisfies the Afriat inequalities in
(RP.5) if and only if Z satisfies the generalized axiom of revealed preference, which is
stated as follows.
Definition 2. For any t v ∈ T , Qt R Qv if PAt Qt ≥ PAt Qv. Next, Qt R Qv if there exists
a sequence k     l (with k     l ∈ T ) such that Qt R Qk    Ql R Qv. The set Z satis-
fies GARP if, for all t v ∈ T , Qt R Qv implies PAv Qt ≥ PAv Qv. We refer to R as a revealed
preference relation.
We now have the following result, which makes use of the binary variables rtv.
Proposition 3. Consider a data set S = {pt Pt;qt Qt}t∈T . The following statements are
equivalent:
(i) For all t ∈ T , there exist xt ∈ R++ such that {pt Pt;xtqt Qt}t∈T is TU-
rationalizable for a household of M individuals (or, equivalently, a single
individual).
(ii) For all t v ∈ T , there exist rtv ∈ {01}, UAt UBt ∈ R+, PAt ∈ RK+ , and PBt ∈ RK++ such
that, for all t v s ∈ T ,
UBt −UBv ≤ pv(qt − qv)+PBv (Qt −Qv) (IP.1)
PAt +PBt = Pt (IP.2)
PAt (Qt −Qv) < rtvC (IP.3)
rtv + rvs ≤ 1+ rts (IP.4)
PAt (Qt −Qv) ≤ (1− rvt)C (IP.5)
with C a given number exceeding all observed PtQt .
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The linear inequalities (IP.1) and (IP.2) are clearly identical to (RP.6) and (RP.7). Fur-
ther, the nonlinear inequalities (RP.5) have been replaced by the linear inequalities
(IP.3)–(IP.5) that make use of real and binary variables. More specifically, (IP.3)–(IP.5)
correspond to the GARP condition in Definition 2.
To explain the inequalities (IP.3)–(IP.5), we interpret the variables rtv in terms of the
revealed preference relation R, i.e., rtv = 1 corresponds to Qt RQv. The constraint (IP.3)
then imposes Qt R Qv (or rtv = 1) whenever PAt Qt ≥ PAt Qv. Next, the constraint (IP.4)
complies with transitivity of the relation R: if Qt R Qv (rtv = 1) and Qv R Qs (rvs = 1),
then Qt RQs (rts = 1). Finally, the constraint (IP.5) states that if Qv RQt (rvt = 1), then
we must have PAt Qt ≤ PAt Qv.
For a given data set S, we can verify the above linear inequalities by using mixed
integer linear programming techniques. It enables us to use solution algorithms that
are specially tailored for such problems (see, for example, Nemhauser and Wolsey 1999).
Given the result in Proposition 3, this effectively checks whether the set S is consistent
with transferable utility (i.e., rationalizable in terms of GQL utility functions).
Appendix C: Conditions (RP.1)–(RP.4) imply GARP
Varian (1982) has shown that the data set S is consistent with the unitary model of house-
hold consumption if and only if it satisfies GARP (see Definition 2, where we replace Z
by S). In what follows, we show that S satisfies GARP if it satisfies conditions (RP.1)–(RP.4)
in Proposition 1.
From (RP.2) it follows that
(βt + xt)− (βv + xv)≤ pv(qt − qv)+λβv (Qt −Qv)+ xt − xv
Then, using (RP.4), we obtain
u¯tαt − u¯vαv ≤ pv(qt − qv)+ (λ)v(Qt −Qv)+ xt − xv
Next, adding u¯v(αv − αt) to both sides and making use of (RP.1) gives
(u¯t − u¯v)αt ≤ pv(qt − qv)+λβv (Qt −Qv)+ u¯v(αv − αt)+ xt − xv
≤ pv(qt − qv)+λβv (Qt −Qv)− u¯vλαv (Qt −Qv)+ xt − xv
Finally, from (RP.3), we get
(u¯t − u¯v)αt ≤ pv(qt − qv)+Pv(Qt −Qv)+ xt − xv
Now, the above inequality shows that if pvqv + PvQv + xv ≥ pvqt + PvQt + xt , then
u¯v ≥ u¯t . Hence, if (qvQvxv)R (qt Qt  xt), then also u¯v ≥ u¯t . As such, if, on the contrary,
GARP is not satisfied, there must exist observations t and v ∈ T such that u¯v ≥ u¯t and
u¯t > u¯v, a contradiction.
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